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Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (June 25, 2015)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROCEDURAL BARS TO POST-CONVICTION PETITIONS 
Summary    
The Court held that the petitions filed by the appellant, Kevin James Lisle (Lisle), were 
procedurally barred. The Court determined that a petitioner cannot present new evidence of 
mitigating circumstances in order to prove actual innocence of the death penalty. The Court 
determined that the claims of Lisle did not warrant relief and upheld the district court ruling. 
Background    
A jury found Lisle guilty of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon in the shooting of 
Kip Logan. The jury sentenced Lisle to death. Lisle filed a post-conviction petition challenging 
his conviction and sentence, which the district court dismissed. Lisle filed a second post-
conviction petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the 
second petition and Lisle appealed.  
Discussion    
In order file a post-conviction petition there are two procedural bars a petitioner must 
overcome: (1) the petitioner is limited to one2 and (2) it must be filed in a timely manner.3 These 
procedural bars may be overcome if the petitioner proves that (1) a court’s refusal to consider the 
petition on its merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice and (2) good cause or 
actual prejudice for the delay exists. 
Lisle failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice 
 The Court has acknowledged that a Brady4 violation may be used to prove good cause 
and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bars to a post-conviction petition. Proving a 
Brady violation requires that the petitioner: (1) prove cause by showing that the state, 
intentionally or inadvertently, withheld favorable evidence, (2) prove prejudice by showing the 
withheld evidence was material, and (3) make the claim within a reasonable time after the 
defense discovers the withheld evidence.  
 In this case, Lisle received the evidence at issue thirteen years before filing the petition.  
The Court found that Lisle did not provide facts that demonstrated the reasonable timeliness of 
his filing. Lisle did not meet the burdens required to prove a Brady violation.  
 Lisle made other good cause claims based on ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Lisle filed the petition six years after the denial of his first post-conviction petition. The 
Court found that these claims were not made within a reasonable time, because the same time bar 
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applies to successive petitions. The Court determined that Lisle’s remaining claims lacked merit 
and could not overcome the procedural rules. 
Lisle failed to demonstrate actual innocence 
 A court may still reach the merits of a petition barred for procedural reasons if failure to 
consider the petition would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The petitioner must 
present new evidence to show that he is actually innocent or is not eligible for the death penalty. 
Lisle did not demonstrate actual innocence of the crime 
 Lisle presented new evidence to prove his innocence of the crime. The Court found that 
the new evidence did not undermine the key testimonial evidence presented in the case. Thus, 
Lisle failed to demonstrate that, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would have 
found him guilty of the crime.  
Lisle did not demonstrate actual innocence of the death penalty 
 Lisle argued that he was innocent of the death penalty. He claimed that (1) the original 
evidence was insufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of the crime and (2) that based 
on new mitigating evidence no rational juror would have sentenced him to the death penalty.  
 Analyzing the first claim, the Court found that Lisle did not present any new evidence to 
support his claim regarding the aggravating circumstance. Without new evidence Lisle could not 
demonstrate actual innocence. 
The second claim presented an issue of first impression for the Court: “can a claim of 
actual innocence of the death penalty offered as a gateway to reach a procedurally defaulted 
claim be based on a showing of new evidence of mitigating circumstances?” The Court focused 
on a Supreme Court precedent5 that rejected admitting new mitigating evidence when 
considering the exception to procedural bars. The Court cited two observations: (1) the inclusion 
of new mitigating evidence would lower the bar to the exception and (2) because mitigating 
evidence is subjective and broad, it would change the narrow exception to a broader gateway. 
The Court examined the standards used when imposing the death penalty, noting two 
phases: (1) the “eligibility” phase, where the jury narrows the type of defendants eligible to 
receive the death penalty and (2) the “selection” phase, where the jury determines if an 
individual defendant is eligible for the death penalty. The Court uses the term “eligibility” to 
refer to both the narrowing and individualized consideration phases of the capital sentencing 
process, because Nevada law6 precludes a jury from issuing the death penalty if mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 
The jury’s discretion to impose the death sentence does not expand the narrowing phase 
to include the individualized consideration phase. The weighing of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances is part of the individualized consideration phase. The Court differentiated between 
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actual innocence of the crime and mitigating evidence, because the elements of the crime are 
determined by statutory definitions, while mitigating evidence is not. Mitigating circumstances 
require a moral determination and cannot be confined by a particular statute, because it 
encompasses the multitude of human frailties.  
The Court noted that the actual innocence inquiry must look to objective factors to 
determine if a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. The Court resisted opening up the 
actual innocence gateway to new mitigating evidence because doing so would allow the 
exception to consume the procedural bars. A defendant may not overcome the procedural bars to 
a petition by claiming innocence based on new mitigating evidence.  
Conclusion 
Thus, Lisle failed to overcome the procedural bars to his post-conviction petitions. He did 
not demonstrate his actual innocence in either the underlying crime or his sentence to the death 
penalty. The Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the post-conviction petitions. 
